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RECENT DECISIONS
plaintiff. The Wisconsin test, which may well be called the "intent test,"
was put this way by Justice Wickhem:
".. . The test (for scope of employment) is whether the servant
has stepped aside from the business of his principal to accomplish
an independent purpose of his own, or whether he was actuated
by an intent to carry out his employment and to serve his
master."' 0
In the application of this test, an employee could, in fact have deviated
from the route prescribed by his employer, and still be within the scope
of his employment. There is the possibility that by applying this test to
the case under discussion, a different result could have been possible.
Assume that the driver of a car owned by his employer aids another
employee in the completion of that other employee's duties. That might
well be done with the intent to aid the employer, and yet in fact be a
deviation from a prescribed route. This test, in application at least, does
not automatically put an employee outside the scope of his employment
for any deviation which would be the result from a strict application of
the common law rule." The Wisconsin rule appears to lend itself to
wide application without strain or hardship on the parties.
A rule that puts an employee outside the scope of his employment
where there is any deviation is a harsh one and should not be extended.
The Restatement of Agency'12 states that if the servant is actuated by the
purpose to serve his master's business to any appreciable extent, the
master should be subject to liability. This rule would, it seems, give a
result similar to the rules of Wisconsin and Washington. The Restate-
ment rule would seem to be a better rule than the one applied in the
instant case. Naturally, where there is a clear and certain deviation
from the scope of his employment that is more than a slight deviation,
and such deviation in no way benefits the employer, the employer should
not be held.
HARoLD M. FRAUENDORFER
Constitutional Law - Church and State - Validity of "Re-
leased Time" Program -Petitioners, parents of public school chil-
dren, brought this proceeding to compel the Board of Education of
the City of New York to halt the released time program for religious
education in the public schools of New York City. This program per-
mitted parents to withdraw their children from the public school for one
hour per week to receive religious instruction. Petitioners, who did not
avail themselves of the program and were in no wise obliged to do so,
challenged the constitutionality of the released time program on the
'
0 Linden v. City Car Co., supra, note 9.
"'Supra, note 3.
'12 RETATEMENT, AGENCY, Sec. 236, Comment (b).
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ground that it violated the First Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion' as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.2
Lower court dismissed the proceedings.3 Held: Affirmed. New York
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States found
the program not violative of the Constitution. The principal case was
distinguished from the McCollum case4 on the facts. Zorach v. Clauson,
303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951), affirmed, 72 S.Ct.... (1952).
The released time program has existed in New York for many
years without express statutory authority." It originated in Gary,
Indiana, and was developed in response to the plea that public school
children were receiving a "Godless" education.6 By 1947 it had spread
to some 2,000 communities7 and had support of Catholics, Jews and
Protestants alike.8 A New York court held such a program unconstitu-
tional in 1925 because the use-of the school presses to print cards upon
which parents authorized their children to participate in the program
constituted state aid to religion.9 However, the following year a released
time program without that objectionable feature was upheld.' ° The
court felt neither the Constitution nor the law discriminated against
religion. Finally in 1940 the New York Legislature by statute authorized
a program such as the kind upheld in the principal case."
Released time programs have been found constitutional by several
state courts.12 Constitutional objections to the right of school authorities
to release pupils for even so short a time have generally been made on
three grounds: (1) It is a violation of the Constitutional provision
respecting the establishment of religion; (2) It amounts to an uncon-
stitutional use of public moneys for sectarian purposes, and (3) It
violates the compulsory attendance statutes.' 3 The plan's opponents
2 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; . . !' U.S. CoNsw., Amend. 1.
2 Everson v. Board of Education et al., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711
(1947).
3 Zorach v. Clauson, 198 Misc. 631, 99 N.Y.S. (2d) 339 (1950) ; Aff'd. 278 App.
Div. 573, 102 N.Y.S. (2d) 27 (1951).
4 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71 et
al., 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948).
5 Principal Case, 100 N.E. (2d) 464 (N.Y., 1951).
6R. F. Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitu-
tional Law, 45 ILl. L. R-v. 333 (1950).
7 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 4, 333 U.S. at p.
225.
8Supra, note 6.
9 Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y. S. 822 (1925).
20Lewis v. Graves, 127 Misc. 135, 215 N.Y. S. 632 (1926) ; Affd. sub nom People
ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 219 App. Div. 233, 219 N.Y. S. 189 (1927); Aff'd.
245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927).
"INEw YORK EDUCATION LAW (1940), §3210-1-b.
32 Gordon v. Board of Education, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 464, 178 P. (2d) 488 (1947);
People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education, 384 Ill. 228, 68 N.E. (2d) 305
(1946); People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.
(2d) 161 (1947).
23Note, 167 A.L.R. 1473.
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have contended that the dismissal of public school children for religious
instruction clashes with the "wall of separation" between Church and
State ;14 if not in theory, then in practice.la An Illinois court could not
see how a released time program violated the constitutional barriers and,
while it approved the separation of Church and State, how there could
be any conflict between religion and the state or any disfavor of religion
as such.' No abuse of compulsory education laws was found because
school authorities were vested with discretionary powers. Release from
school for religious instruction has been upheld as no more unconstitu-
tional than release to attend religious services17 or no more violative of
compulsory attendance regulations than release to take dancing lessons38
The California Court of Appeals upheld a released time program in
1947.11 The justices rejected the contention that the program was
violative of the provisions of the California Constitution guaranteeing
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, and
prohibiting the appropriation of public money for the support of any
sectarian doctrine, directly or indirectly, in the public schools of the
state. The court also said that there was no violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The validity of released time was argued before the United States
Supreme Court for the first time in the famous McCollum case.2 0 The
Champaign, Illinois, program had been upheld by the Illinois Supreme
Court2 and upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court was found
to be a violation of the First Amendment. That decision has made it
necessary to review constitutionally all released time programs. Does
the McCollum finding strike down all released time programs? The
opinions of the justices in that case do not give us any definite answer.
The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter is a basis for assuming
that it does not.2 2 However, Justice Reed, the lone dissenter, indicates
that it might.2' Several authorities have concluded that the decision does
not intend that all released time programs be considered unconstitution-
' Everson v. Board of Education, supra, note 2.
'5 Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 836 (1949).
'16 People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education, supra, note 12.
17 Principal Case, 100 N.E. (2d) 468 (N.Y., 1951).
:8 People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, supra, note 10.
29 Gordon v. Board of Education, supra, note 12.
20 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 4.2 1 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 12.
22 "We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not before us,
though colloquially characterized as 'released time,' (they) present situations
.differing in aspects that may well be constitutionally crucial." Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 4, 333 U.S. at p. 231.
2"From the tenor of the opinions I conclude that their teachings are that
any use of a pupil's school time, whether that use is on or off the school
grounds, with the necessary school regulations to facilitate attendance, falls
under the ban. . . . I can only deduce that religious instruction of public
school children during school hours is prohibited." Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Education, supra, note 4, 333 U.S. at pp. 240-241.
1952]
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al.24 Their reasoning is based on the fact that the released time program
involved in the McCollum case provided that: (1) The religious
instruction would take place within the public school building and
during regular class hours, and (2) The state tax-supported school
system would provide pupils for religious classes through the use of
the state's compulsory school attendance machinery.2 The earlier state
court decisions that upheld released time all involved religious in-
struction outside the public school buildings.
The McCollum case had left to the courts two approaches to released
time: (1) All released time programs violate the First Amendment, or
(2) Released time programs as such are not per se unconstitutional,
but that the facts of each case must be considered to determine whether
there is a violation of separation of Church and State. The principal
case indicates that the New York courts have apparently elected to adopt
the latter view. 26 Released time programs vary in many respects. Some
of the most important differences are: (1) The amount of supervision
by the public school of attendance and performance in religious class;
(2) The amount of school time devoted to the operation of the program;
(3) The extent to which school property and administrative machinery
are involved; (4) The effect of the program on non-participants, and
(5) The amount and nature of the publicity for the program in the
public schools.2 7 The petitioners in the principal case relied heavily upon
the McCollum decision to invalidate this released time program. How-
ever, the majority observed that five justices expressly agreed in the
McCollum case that released time as such is not unconstitutional.2
Adopting the view that each program must be examined on its facts,
they found that under this released time program the religious classes
do not take place within the school, are not under the supervision of
school authorities, are not publicized in the school and are not ac-
companied by a separation of religious groups within the school. 29
Therefore the principal case may be distinguished from the McCollum
case on the facts. They point out that:
"While extreme care must, of course, be exercised to protect the
constitutional rights of these appellants, it must also be remem-
bered that the First Amendment not only forbids laws 'respecting
an establishment of religion,' but also laws prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. We must not destroy one in an effort to pre-
serve the other.... The right of parents to direct the rearing and
24 Feldman, Separation of Church and State in the United States: A Summary
View, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 427.
25 Note, 2 A.L.R. (2d) 1371.
2 6 Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 85 N.Y.S. (2d) 682 (1948).
271 llinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 4, 333 U.S. at p.
225, footnote 17.
28 Principal Case, 100 N.E. (2d) 466 (N.Y., 1951).
29 Ibid., p. 465.
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education of their children, free from any power of the state to
standardize children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public school teachers only, is an unquestioned one."30
Since it is constitutional to release children from school on holy days
set apart by their respective faiths, the majority feels that it is also
constitutional under the circumstances in this case to excuse children
of whatever faith for one hour per week for a similar religious
purpose.3 ' The dissent in the principal case maintains however that the
vital point is not where the religious training is given, but is that the
program secures its pupils through the instrumentality of the state and
the machinery and momentum of the public school system.
32
There is another means of giving religious instruction to public
school pupils that has been adopted by some communities. It has been
given the name "dismissed time." Under this plan, one school day each
week is shortened to allow all children to go where they please. Thus
those who desire to go to a religious school may do so. 33 Apparently
this plan does not violate the First Amendment.3 4 However, religious
leaders have expressed doubt as to the plan's effectivenes and feas-
ibility. -
There have been no decisions considering released time in Wisconsin.
The State Senate of Wisconsin requested the opinion of the State
Attorney-General on the following question:
"Whether or not local school boards may release students during
school hours for attendance at religious instructions conducted
by religious groups outside the school."3 6
The Attorney-General, in view of the McCollum case, gravely doubted
the validity of any plan which makes use of the school regulations to
facilitate attendance at religious instructions, whether those instructions
are given on public school property or not. If the children remain under
the technical jurisdiction of the public school, the program was of doubt-
ful constitutional validity according to him.3 7 The Attorney-General
points out that there is no statute authorizing or forbidding such released
time programs. It appears to him that the requirement of compulsory
attendance is the only statutory barrier to released time.38 In 1926 the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction was advised that a released
time program violated the Wisconsin Constitution.3
9
30 Ibid., p. 468.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 478.
s3 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 4, 333 U.S. at
p. 230.
34 A.G. 281 (Wis., 1949) ; Note 49 COL. L. REv. 836 (1949).35 Note 57 YALE L. J. 1114 (1948).
36Resolution No. 19, S. (1949).37 Supra, note 34.
3 8 Wis. StATS. (1949), Sec. 40.70.
3 15 A.G. 483 (Wis., 1926).
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the principal case
was affirmed on April 28, 1952, by a six to three decision. Justice
Douglas in the majority opinion points out that:
"No one is forced to go to the religious classroom, and no re-
ligious exercise of instruction is brought to the classrooms of the
public schools. A student need not take religious instructions.
He is left to his own desires as to the manner or time of his
religious devotions, if any."
40
The Constitution according to the majority opinion does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State. The opinion declares:
"Rather, it (Constitution) studiously defines the manner, the
specific ways in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the
matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each
other-hostil, suspicious and even unfriendly. We find no
constitutional requirements which makes it necessary for gov-
emnment to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against
efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The
government must be neutral, when it comes to competition be-
tween sects... But it can close its doors to suspend its operations
as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuaries
for worship or instructions. No more than that is undertaken
here."4'
Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion feels that the New York
released time program is unconstitutional because it is founded upon a
use of the state's power of coercion. Another dissenter, Justice Black,
maintains that the majority opinion abandons the state's historic neu-
trality in the religious sphere.4
2
The principal case presented an excellent opportunity to the Su-
preme Court to clarify the rather confused question of religious educa-
tion for public school pupils. It seems to the writer that in view of wide
practical differences in the many released time programs, the holding
of the United States Supreme Court in the principal case has adopted
the correct approach. The McCollum case did not strike down all
released time programs as such, but only the program before it.
J. JOSEPH CUMMINGS
Negligence-Sharing of Expenses as Affecting the Host-Guest
Relation Under the Automobile Guest Statutes-Plaintiffs, husband
and wife, while on an extended vacation trip with the defendants, in an
automobile owned and driven by the defendant husband, were injured
4072 S.Ct.-(1952).41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
[Vol. 35
